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LAW ON THE CAMPUS 1960-1985:
YEARS OF GROWTH AND
CHALLENGE*
WILLIAM

I.

A.

KAPLIN* *

INTRODUCTION: THE INCREASINGLY COMPLEX
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND ACADEME

The last quarter century has witnessed an enormous expansion in
the law's presence on America's campuses. Whether one is engaged in
campus disputes, planning to avoid future disputes, or charting an
institution's policies and priorities, law has become an indispensable
component of decision making. Questions of educational policy have
increasingly become converted into legal questions as well. The last
twenty-five years have seen courts called upon to resolve thorny issues
of academic discipline with respect to student misconduct,, academic
dishonesty,2 and unsatisfactory academic performance. 3 Some institutions4
have been sued for failing to desegregate their student bodies and faculties,
while others have been sued for implementing programs designed to correct
racial imbalances in student bodies and faculties. 5 Faculty members
*

The bulk of this article is adapted from various excerpts from the author's new

volume, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF
ADMINISTRATIVE DEcIsION MAKING (2nd ed. 1985). These excerpts are used by permission
of the copyright holder; copyright © 1985, Jossey-Bass Inc., Publishers, San Francisco.
* * Professor of Law, Catholic University; Consultant to the General Counsel, Catholic University; A.B., University of Rochester, 1964; J.D. Cornell University; 1967; Editor,
Journal of College & University Law (1976-1980). The author acknowledges the contributions of Charles J. Reid, Jr.; J.D. 1982, J.C.L. 1985, Catholic University, who assisted in
the preparation of both this article and the book on which the article is based.
I See, e.g., Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969); Esteban v. Central
Mo. State College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir.
1969).
See, e.g., Henson v. Honor Committee of Univ. of Va. 719 F.2d 69 (4th Cir. 1983);
Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975); Napolitano v. Trustees
of Princeton Univ., 186 N.J. Super. 548, 453 A.2d 263 (1982).
:1 See, e.g., Board of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978);
Gamble v. University of Minn., 639 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1981); Sofair v. State Univ. of N.Y.
Upstate Medical Center, 44 N.Y.2d 475, 377 N.E.2d 730, 406 N.Y.S.2d 276 (1978).
4 See, e.g., Geier v. University of Tenn., 597 F.2d 1056 (6th Cir. 1979); Richardson
v. Blanton, 597 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1979); Norris v. State Council of Higher Educ., 327
F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1971), affd without opinion, 404 U.S. 907 (1971).
See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Valentine
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have challenged institutional decisions regarding the denial of tenure6
as well as its termination.' Researchers have asserted that they possess
an academic freedom privilege exempting them from having to disclose
the results of their scholarship in courtroom settings,8 while other
faculty members have claimed that academic freedom protects them
from having to testify with respect to such matters as tenure decisions."
Institutional authority to regulate student organizations has been challenged. 10 Colleges and universities have been held liable for breaches of
campus security resulting in injury or death to students." Outsiders
have sued institutions to gain access to the campus. 1 2 Student-athletes
injured during practice or competition have sought to apply workers'
compensation law against institutions. 13 Students and others have sought
to apply federal non-discrimination laws to the campus, while some
institutions have sought to limit the reach of these laws.14 Retirement
programs at a number of institutions have been challenged on grounds
that they discriminated on the basis of sex.' 5 Faculties have sought to
v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1981); DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 28 Cal.
3d 875. 625 P.2d 220, 172 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1981); McDonald v. Hogness, 92 Wash. 2d 431,
598 P.2d 707 (1979).
1 See, e.g., Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1984); Kilcoyne v. Morgan,
664 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1981); Beitzell v. Jeffrey, 643 F.2d 870 (1st Cir. 1981); Davis v.
Oregon State Univ., 591 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1978); McLendon v. Morton, 249 S.E.2d 919
(W. Va. 1978).
7 See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Korf v. Ball State Univ., 726
F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1984); Frumkin v. Board of Trustees of Kent State Univ., 626 F.2d 19
(6th Cir. 1980); Adamian v. Jacobsen, 523 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1975).
See, e.g., Buchanan v. American Motors Corp., 697 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983); Dow
Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated
Jan. 4, 1984, 583 F. Supp. 991 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), rev'd and remanded, 750 F.2d 223 (2d
Cir. 1984).
1 See Gray v. Board of Higher Educ., 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982); In re Dinnan,
661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
" See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Papish v. Board of Curators
of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
" See, e.g., Jesik v. Maricopa County Community College Dist., 125 Ariz. 543, 611
P.2d 547 (1980); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389 Mass. 47, 449 N.E.2d 331 (1983);
Miller v. New York, 62 N.Y.2d 506, 467 N.E.2d 493 (1984). But see Relyea v. Florida,
385 So. 2d 1378 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
"I See, e.g., American Future Sys., Inc. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 688 F.2d 907
(3d Cir. 1982), on remand, 553 F. Supp 1268 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (AFS II); American Future
Sys. v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 618 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1980) (AFS I); Brooks v. Auburn
Univ., 412 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1969); Braxton v. Municipal Court, 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514
P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1973); Harrell v. Southern Ill. Univ., 120 Ill. App. 3d 161,
457 N.E.2d 971 (1983); New Jersey v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535. 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
Rensing v. Indiana State Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 444 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. 1983).
See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984); Southeastern
Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441
U.S. 677 (1979).
11 See, e.g., Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n, 691 F.2d 1054 (2d Cir. 1982),
remanded, 463 U.S. 1223 (1983), on remand, 735 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S.Ct. 247 (1984).
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apply federal collective bargaining law to their employment relationships, while institutions have asserted that such law is inconsistent
with the academic model of governance.16 Institutions themselves have
challenged state decisions on chartering and licensure, 1 7 as well as
decisions of accrediting agencies.' 8 In this explosion of litigation, apparently no icon has been safe: Institutions have taken to the courts to
sue the leading athletic association over television broadcast rights for
football games. 19
As judicial business has expanded, so has the use of administrative
agencies as alternative forums for airing legal disputes. Over the last twentyfive years, particularly through the 1970s, a torrent of new regulations has
been promulgated by federal and, to a lesser extent, state and local,
agencies. Despite recent talk of government deregulation, most of these
regulations are still in force, and new regulations are still being issued.
Thus, postsecondary institutions may find themselves before the federal
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Education Appeal Board of the U.S. Department of
Education or the administrative law judges for the Department's Office
for Civil Rights, agency boards of contract appeals, the appellate division
of the Internal Revenue Service, state licensing or approval boards, state
public employment or civil service commission, state workers' compensation and unemployment compensation boards, state and local human
relations commissions, local zoning boards, and other quasi-judicial
bodies at all levels of government. Proceedings can be complex, and
the legal sanctions that such agencies may invoke can be substantial.
Paralleling these developments has been an increase in the forums
for dispute resolution created by private organizations and associations
involved in postsecondary governance or by institutions themselves.

,6 See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980); Loretto Heights College
v. NLRB, 742 F.2d 1245 (10th Cir. 1984); NLRB v. Stephens Inst., 620 F.2d 720 (9th Cir
1980). See also Lewis Univ., 265 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1982), rev'd in part, 765 F.2d 616 (7th
Cir. 1985); College of Notre Dame, 245 N.L.R.B. 386 (1979); Barber-Scotia College, Inc.
245 N.L.R.B. 406 (1979) (in all of these cases the NLRB declined to extend the principles
of NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), to higher education). See infro notes
126-128 and accompanying text.
7 See, e.g., New Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Board of Directors of Shelton
College, 90 N.J. 470, 448 A.2d 988 (1982); Nova Univ. v. Board of Governors of Univ. of
N.C., 305 N.C. 156, 287 S.E.2d 872 (1982); Shelton College v. State Bd. of Higher Educ.,
48 N.J. 501, 226 A.2d 612 (1967); State v. Williams, 253 N.C. 337, 117 S.E.2d 444 (1960).
,8 Marlboro Corp. v. Association of Independent Colleges and Schools, 556 F.2d 78
(1st Cir. 1977); Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle States Ass'n. of Colleges and
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970);
Rockland Inst., Division of Amistad Vocational Schools, Inc. v. Association of Independent Colleges and Schools, 412 F. Supp. 1015 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Parsons College v. North
Cent. Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
" National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 104 S.
Ct. 2948 (1984).
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Thus, besides appearing before courts and administrative agencies,
postsecondary institutions may become involved in grievance procedures for faculty and staff unions, hearings of accrediting agencies on
the accreditation status of institutional programs, probation hearings of
athletic conferences, and censure proceedings of the American Association of University Professors. Similarly, postsecondary institutions have
created internal processes, such as faculty grievance committees, student judiciaries, and honor boards for resolving disputes without resort
to outside agencies. Other new processes have been created by institutions because they are required by law-for instance, the institutional
review boards that oversee certain scientific experimentation as mandated by federal regulations. 20
The remainder of this article highlights some of the most significant
evolving aspects of the relationship between law and academia. The
discussion is not exhaustive; it is intended to whet, rather than satisfy,
the reader's appetite and to provide the background against which other
more specific developments of the past quarter century may be addressed.
II.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN SOCIAL

STRUCTURES AND EDUCATIONAL POLICIES

Traditionally, the law accorded postsecondary institutions extensive
autonomy in their daily operations. The academic environment was
thought to be delicate and complex. Outsiders such as lawyers or judges
would, almost by definition, be ignorant of the special arrangements
and sensitivies underpinning this environment. Academia could operate
well, by this view, only when its traditional means of governance by
consensus and collegiality was fully respected.
The judiciary developed various doctrines that had the effect of
protecting this academic autonomy. The college's relationship to its
students was said to be parental in nature. Since the college acted in
loco parentis, it could exercise virtually unchecked authority over
students' lives.21 Students similarly could not rely on claims to constitutional rights. Constitutional constraints did not apply at all to private
education, and attendance at public postsecondary institutions was
considered a privilege and not a right. Being a "privilege," attendance

In See

DuVal, The Human Subjects Protection Committee: An Experiment in Decen-

tralized Federal Regulation, 1979 A.B.F. RESEARCH J. 571.
" See, e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913). In Gott, the
court held that since:
[clollege authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral
welfare and mental training of the pupils.., we are unable to see why, to that
end, they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or betterment
of their pupils that a parent could make for the same purpose.
Id. at 379, 161 S.W. at 206.
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could constitutionally be extended and was subject to termination on
whatever conditions the institution determined were in its and the
students' best interests. 22 Occasionally courts did hold that students had
some contract rights under an express or implied contractual relation
with the institution, but typically the institution was given virtually
contract, once
unlimited power to dictate the contract terms, and the
2
made, was construed heavily in the institution's favor. 1
Courts were similarly deferential when it came to questions of
academic employment. Academic judgments regarding appointment,
promotion, and tenure were thought to be expert judgments suitably
governed by the complex traditions of the academic world. Furthermore,
the Constitution did not protect faculty members any more than it did
students. The Constitution did not extend to private education, and
academic employment24 in public institutions was also held to be a
privilege, not a right.

In the years following World War II, various events conjoined to
re-shape postsecondary education's external and internal environment,
thus laying the groundwork for later challenges to academic autonomy.
The G.I. Bill expansions of the late 1940s and early 1950s, and the
"baby-boom" expansion of the 1960s, brought large numbers of new
students, faculty members, and administrative personnel into the educational process. The expanding pool of persons seeking postsecondary
education also prompted the growth of new educational institutions and
programs, as well as new methods for delivering educational services.
The changed demographics of higher education resulted in other signif1 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934).
2:1 See, e.g., Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 A.D. 487, 231 N.Y.S.
435 (1928) (the
institution's action in dismissing a student was upheld by the court without assigning a
reason but apparently because she was not a "typical Syracuse girl").
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, serving at the time on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court and writing an opinion upholding the firing of a police officer, enunciated what
would come to be the classic statement of the right-privilege distinction in public
employment:
The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman. There are few employments for hire in
which the servant does not agree to suspend his constitutional rights of free
speech as well as of idleness by the implied terms of his contract. The servant
cannot complain, as he takes the employment on the terms which are offered
him.
[McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517-518 (1892).]

One of the most important legal changes during the last twenty-five years was the
"demise" of this right-privilege distinction as applied to public employment and other
matters. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).

1- The Serviceman's Readjustment Act of 1944, 58 Stat. 284, was amended numerous
times in the 1940s and 1950s. The Act and its amendments are codified at 38 U.S.C. §§
1801-1827 (1982).
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icant shifts as well. Becuase of the increased job and promotion opportunities occasioned by rapid growth, there were many new academics
who were unfamiliar with and had insufficient time to learn the old
rules. Other new arrivals were hostile to traditional attitudes and values
because they perceived them as part of a process that had excluded
their group or race or sex from access to academic opportunity in earlier
days. For others in newer settings-such as junior and community
colleges, technical institutes, and experiential learning programs-the
traditional trappings of academia simply did not fit.
The established patterns of deference to authority and tradition
were also increasingly irrelevant to many of the new students. The
emergence of the student-veteran; the loosening of the "lock-step"
pattern of educational preparation, which led students directly from
high school to college to graduate work; and, finally, the lowered age
of majority-all combined to make the in loco parentis relationship
between institution and student less and less tenable. New demands for
professional credentials also made higher education an economic necessity for many. Some students, such as the G.I. Bill veterans, had cause
to view higher education as an earned right.
As a broader and larger cross section of the world passed through
postsecondary education's gates, institutions became more tied to the
outside world. Spurred on by Sputnik and then by promises of new
frontiers and great societies, government signed on as a partner in the
higher education enterprise. 26 Links in the partnership were forged by
the enactment of such laws as the National Defense Education Act of
1958,27 the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,28 and the Higher
Education Act of 1965.29 An increasingly complex government also
came to rely on the resources of higher education institutions in many
fields of basic and applied research.
Higher education institutions came into contact with the outside
world in other ways as well. During the past twenty-five years, private
foundations became an increasingly important source of institutional income. Social and political movements-notably the civil rights movement
and the movement against the Vietnam War-became a more integral part
of campus life. And when these movements, along with the other

See H.D.

GRAHAM,

THE UNCERTAIN

KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS

TRIUMPH:

(1984). See generally,

FEDERAL EDUCATION

POLICY

IN THE

ADVISORY COMMITFEE ON INTERGOVERN-

MENTAL RELATIONS, THE EvOLUTION OF A PROBLEMATIC PARTNERSHIP: THE FEDS AND HIGHER ED
(1981).
" Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1590 (1958) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 20 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
" Pub. L. No. 88-204, 77 Stat. 363 (1963) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 701710 (1982)).

'9 Pub. L. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219 (1965) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 10011150 (1982)).
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outside influences, converged on postsecondary institutions, the law
came also.
By the early 1970s the old autonomy was only a nostalgic reminiscence. The realities of the relationship between law and academe had
dramatically changed. Federal and state governments had become heavily involved in postsecondary education, creating many new legal
requirements and new forums for raising legal challenges.o Students,
teachers, other employees, and outsiders had become more willing and
more able to sue postsecondary institutions and their officials. Courts
had become more willing to entertain such suits on their merits and to
offer relief from certain institutional actions." Institutions themselves
were increasingly resorting to the courts to protect their own interests.
In the 1980s the development of higher education law continues to
reflect, and be reflected in, social and political movements in higher
education and in the world outside the campus. Perhaps the most
obvious changes have been in the area of the federal government's
support for the partnership that it had built with higher education. 2
Budgets are cut, and programs are reduced or eliminated. In the
scramble for funds, issues arise concerning equitable allocation of funds
among and within institutions and among various categories of needy
students. As the burden of diminishing support is perceived to fall on
minority and low-income students, whose numbers may decrease if
government aid is not forthcoming, or on the minority and women
faculty newcomers most subject to layoffs prompted by budget cuts,
new civil rights issues are emerging. As the pool of funds available for
institutional aid shrinks, institutions consider alliances with the corpo33
rate hi-tech world that, in turn, create other new legal programs.
Government budget cutting also adds new impetus to yet another
prominent trend: institutional responses to tighter financial times. Because of the combined pressures of inflation, new types of institutional
costs (such as computers and other technology), declining enrollments,
and now, government aid reduction, financial belt-tightening has become a fact of life affecting many aspects of institutional operation.
Many legal questions have arisen concerning standards and procedures
for faculty and staff layoffs, termination of tenured faculty, and reduction or termination of programs. 34 As some institutions are strained to
"

See CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, THE CONTROL OF THE

CAMPUS: A REPORT ON THE GOVERNANCE OF HIGHER EDUCATION

See

(1982).

R.

O'NEIL, THE COURTS, GOVERNMENT, AND HIGHER EDUCATION (1972).
IMPACT AND CHALLENGES OF A CHANGING FEDERAL ROLE (V.A. Hodgkinson ed. 1985).

Tatel,& Guthrie, The Legal Ins and Outs of University-Industry Collaboration, 64
EDUC. REc. 19 (1983).
14 See, e.g., Jimenez v. Almodovar, 650

F.2d 363 (1st Cir. 1981); Krotkoff v. Goucher
College, 585 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1978); AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 129 N.J. Super. 249,
322 A.2d 846 (1974), aff'd, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 346 A.2d 615 (1975).
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their financial limits, other35 questions concerning closures, mergers, and
bankruptcies have arisen.

The story of higher education in the 1980s, however, is by no
means primarily one of retrenchment. Numerous other trends and
innovations seemingly foreshadow the path of future legal development.
One of the most significant is the mushrooming technological revolution
on campus. The use of computers creates new issues of privacy, as well
as new contract, patent, and copyright issues. 3 Biotechnological research raises issues concerning use of human subjects 37 and the patentability and licensing of discoveries. 3 Devising and enforcing

specifications for the lease or purchase of technology for office support,
laboratories, or innovative learning systems creates complex contract/
commercial law problems.
Related to the technological revolution is the expanding alliance
between the campus and the corporate world.3 9 As this alliance is
forged, questions of institutional autonomy and academic freedom are
being raised. Complex problems concerning the structuring of research
agreements, patent and licensing arrangements, and trade secrets now
present themselves.40 The specter of conflicts of interest, for both faculty
researchers and the institution as a corporate entity, arises .4 And federal
government support for university-industrial cooperative research has
become an issue, as has federal regulation in such sensitive4 2areas as
genetic engineering and dissemination of research discoveries.

- See Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe College, 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983). See generally
J. O'NEILL & S. BARNETT, COLLEGES AND CORPORATE CHANGE: MERGER, BANKRUPTCY, AND
CLOSURE (1981).
" See P. HOLLANDER, COMPUTERS IN EDUCATION: LEGAL LIABILITIES CONCERNING THEIR
USE AND ABUSE (1985); Lautsch, Computers and the University Attorney: An Overview of
Computer Law on Campus, 5 J. COLL. & U.L. 217 (1978).
' See D.M. MALONEY, PROTECTION OF HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
TO FEDERAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS (1984); President's Commission for the Study of Ethical
Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, First Biennial Report, 47
Fed. Reg. 13,272 (1982).
:1 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S.
303 (1980); Smith, Implications of Uniform Patent Legislation to Colleges and Universities, 8 J. CoLL. & U.L. 82 (1981).
" Bach & Thornton, Academic-Industrial Partnerships in Biomedical Research:
Inevitability and Desirability,64 EDuc. REC. 26 (1983).
o Fowler, University-Industry Research Relationships: The Research Agreement, 9
J. COLL. & U.L. 515 (1982).
" Comment, Ties That Bind: Conflicts of Interest in University-Industry Links, 17
U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 895 (1984).

42 Regulations governing recombinant DNA research have proved to be especially
volatile and subject to numerous revision; the most recent NIH regulations are found at
49 Fed. Reg. 46,256 (1984). Regarding dissemination of the work product of federally
funded research, see the Uniform Patent Legislation found at Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat.
3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 200-211 (1982)).
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Another major trend is student (or educational) consumerism.43 A
shift from a seller's to a buyer's market has spurred competition among
institutions in the search for students and introduced marketing techniques and attitudes into postsecondary education. A new emphasis on
students as consumers of education with attendant rights, to whom
institutions owe corresponding responsibilities, has further undermined
the traditional concept of education as a privilege. Student litigation on
matters such as tuition and financial aid, course offerings, award of
degrees, campus security, and support services has become more common, as have governmental efforts at consumer protection regulation on
behalf of students.
Institutional self-regulation, partly a response to student consumerism, has also gained in significance. 44 The movement is not back to
the old days of institutional autonomy, when institutions governed their
cloistered worlds by tradition and consensus. Rather, the new movement is spawning an increase in institutional guidelines and regulations
on matters concerning students and faculty and in grievance processes
for airing complaints.45 On the one hand, by creating new rights and
responsibilities or making existing ones explicit, this movement gives
members of campus communities more claims to press against one
another. On the other hand, the new self-regulation facilitates the
internal and more collegial resolution of claims, forestalling the intervention of courts, legislatures, and administrative agencies in campus
matters.
Federal government deregulation of education, another nascent
trend, is the flip side of institutional self-regulation: success at the latter
may be urged as justification for the former and vice versa. Substantial
deregulation, would, of course, reduce the numbers and types of federal
requirements applicable to campuses; it would also reduce the potential
for lawsuits and administrative agency proceedings concerning federal
requirements. But the deregulation flame has not yet set fire to any
forests. How far it will progress-or how much federal regulation, if
removed, would be replaced by comparable state regulation or selfregulation-is not clear; nor is it clear that deregulation as currently
envisioned would inevitably benefit education.4"
43 D. RIESMAN, ON HIGHER EDUCATION: THE ACADEMIC ENTERPRISE IN AN ERA OF RISING
STUDENT CONSUMERISM (1981).
4 See CARNEGIE COUNCIL ON POLICY STUDIES ON HIGHER EDUCATION, FAIR PRACTICES IN
HIGHER EDUCATION: RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF STUDENTS AND THEIR COLLEGES IN A PERIOD
OF INTENSIFIED COMPETITION FOR ENROLLMENTS (1979).
41 See, e.g., E. EL-KHAWAS, NEW EXPECTATIONS FOR FAIR PRACTICE: SUGGESTIONS FOR
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW (1976); EI-Khawas, Solving Problems Through Self-Regulation, EDuc.
REC. 323 (1978); Saunders, How to Keep the Government from Playing the Featured Role,
59 EDUC. REc. 61 (1978).
" W. CLUNE, THE DEREGULATION CRITIQUE' OF THE FEDERAL ROLL IN EDUCATION (Project
Rpt. No. 82-All, Institute for Research on Educational Finance and Governance, Stanford
University (1982)).
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In addition to these trends, the post-World War II movement toward
diversity in postsecondary education has continued into the 1980s in
important ways. Although the 1970s brought some moderation in the
birth and growth of institutions and expansion of student bodies, the
diversity of students and of special educational programs to serve their
needs has nevertheless increased. The percentage of women enrolled as
students is greater than ever before; women, in fact, are now a majority. 47 The proportion of blacks also increased in the 1970s, with black
student enrollment increasing more rapidly than white student enrollment, especially in community colleges.41 The proportion of postsecondary students who are "adult learners," beyond the traditional college
9
age of eighteen to twenty-four years old, has also increased markedly.4
The proportion of part-time students (many of whom are also women
and/or adult learners) has similarly increased, with part-time enrollments rising much faster than full-time enrollments in the 1970s.50
Military personnel have become a substantial component of the adultlearner and part-timer populations. Moreover, new federal laws and
regulations protecting handicapped persons have laid the basis for an
influx of handicapped students into higher education."
One further category of students, posing challenges different from
the categories above, has also begun substantial growth: foreign students. These students are making a particularly important contribution
to campus diversity and are also having a direct impact on law. The
application of immigration law to foreign students has become a major
concern for federal officials who must balance shifting political and
educational concerns as they devise and enforce regulations, and for
postsecondary administrators who must work within these complex
regulations on their own campuses.5 2
These changes in the student population have been reflected, as
expected, in changes in the universe of postsecondary institutions and
programs. Community colleges and private two-year institutions have
" Cowan, Higher Education Has Obligations to a New Majority,

CHRON. OF HIGHER

EDUC., June 23, 1980, at 48, col. 1.

.1 BLACK

STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: CONDITIONS AND EXPERIENCES IN THE 1970s

(G. Thomas ed. 1981).
.. K. CROSS, ADULTS

As LEARNERS: INCREASING PARTICIPATION AND FACILITATING LEARNING

(1981).

'o Ostar, Part-Time Students: The New Majority for the 1980's, CHRON. OF HIGHER
Oct. 7, 1981, at 56, Col. 1.
See particularly the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 791-796, and the
implementing regulations in 34 C.F.R. Part 104 (1984); and see generally L. ROTHSTEIN,
RIGHTS OF PHYSICALLY HANDICAPPED PERSONS (1984). Students with orthopedic impairments
require removal of architectural barriers, and students with other handicaps may be
EDUC.,

entitled to other reasonable accomodations. Professor Rothstein's book provides a detailed

discussion of these issues and related litigation.
" For analysis of the actual and projected growth of the foreign student population,
and the challenges it creates for institutions, see AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN STUDENTS AND INS1TTUTIONAL POLICY, FOREIGN STUoEN'S AND INsrTTUnONAL
PolICY: TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (1982). Recent presidential administrations' use of
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become more prominent, as their student enrollments and the numbers
of new institutions grew at a faster rate than four-year and graduate
institutions. 3 Postsecondary education programs sponsored by private
industry have increased, creating a new context for questions about
state degree-granting authority and private accreditation, as well as
about academic freedom and other faculty/student rights and obligations. Work-study programs, internships, and other forms of experiential
education have increased in numbers and importance. 4 The movement
raises new questions on matters such as institutional liability for offcampus acts; the use of affiliation agreements with outside entities; and
coverage of experiential learners under workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and minimum wage laws.
As is evident from even this cursory review, the contemporary
world of higher education stands in stark contrast to that of twenty-five
years ago. Student bodies and faculties have changed in significant
ways, having different needs and posing different challenges which
higher education is addressing through a variety of innovations as well
as through traditional structures. The federal government's partnership
with higher education has gone through several metamorphoses as
federal support, having steadily increased through much of the 1960s
and 70s, is now trimmed back. Technological inventions undreamt of
twenty-five years ago now demand equally innovative responses. Law has
played a role in all these permutations, sometimes hindering creativity,
at other times facilitating it, and often confounding those who would try
to wish the law away.
III.
A.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE DICHOTOMY BETWEEN
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS

A Malleable Boundary

Since at least the nineteenth century, as states began to establish
their own institutions,5 5 the public-private dichotomy has been essential
the immigration laws as instruments of foreign policy has had a substantial impact on
higher education. One of the Carter Administration's responses to the Iranian hostage
crisis, for example, was the promulgation of a regulation (subsequently codified at 8
C.F.R. § 214.5 (1985)) requiring Iranian students resident in the United States to provide
evidence of their continuing nonimmigrant status. This regulation was upheld in Narenji
v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979): The Reagan Administration has used the
broad authority of the federal government to exclude or condition the entry of visitors to
the United States as a means of limiting exchanges between American and eastern bloc
scholars. See, e.g., Hook, U.S. Denies Visas to 2 Marxist Cuban Profesors Invited to
Address Philosophy Meeting, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDuc., January 5, 1983, at 8, col. 1.
A. COHEN AND F. BRAWER, THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY COLLEGE (1982).
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR

LEARNING

P.J. Tate ed. 1978).
. See, e.g., D. TEWKSBURY, THE
BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1965).

BY

ExPERIENCE--WHAT,

WHY,

How (M.T. Keeton and

FOUNDING OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES
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to an understanding of higher education law.96 Historically, public and
private institutions developed to serve different sets of interests. State
institutions have provided a convenient and relatively inexpensive
means of obtaining a postsecondary education. Private schools, on the
other hand, although typically costing more to attend, have been able
to address needs that public institutions often could not serve because
of legal or political constraints."'
The law historically has had markedly different applications to
public and to private institutions. Public institutions were subject to the
plenary authority of the government that created them. Private institutions, capitalizing on the concept of institutional autonomy, were largely
shielded from intrusive government regulation. State and federal statutes, when they did apply to educational institutions, often treated
public and private institutions differently. Public institutions and their
officers were charged with responsibility for respecting the rights of
individuals established in the federal constitution and in state constitutions; private institutions and their officers, in contrast, were not
constrained by these constitutional requirements. On the other hand,
public institutions could often avoid being sued for their torts and
breaches of contract by claiming sovereign immunity, while private
institutions had only the less-recognized protection sometimes accorded
by the charitable immunity doctrine. 8
In the past quarter century, however, the public-private boundary
has been redrawn at various points and at various times, and parts of
the boundary line have become indistinct. Private institutions are now
much more heavily regulated by government. Federal statutes and
regulations now often accord similar treatment to public and private
institutions. Through the device of the state action doctrine, private
institutions and their officers are now sometimes subject to the constraints of the federal constitution, and there is a recent trend toward
applying state constitutional constraints to private institutions in some
circumstances. As for public institutions, the sovereign immunity doc-

For an early manifestation of the dichotomy, see Trustees of Dartmouth College v.
Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
"' One commentator has noted that private education draws strength from "the very
possibility of doing something different than government can do, of creating an institution
free to make choices government cannot-even seemingly arbitrary ones-without having
to provide justification that will be examined in a court of law." H. FRIENDLY, THE
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CASE AND THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE PENUMBRA 30 (1969).

" For classic applications of sovereign immunity, see, e.g., Livingston v. Regents of
New Mexico College, 64 N.M. 306, 328 P.2d 78 (1953); Wolfe v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp.,
170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959). Regarding the charitable immunity, see the
classic application in Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E.
649 (1916); but see President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d
810 (D.C. Cir. 1942), a case criticizing the doctrine and limiting its applicability.
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trine has eroded sufficiently that they are often subject to tort and
contract suits in much the same manner as private institutions."' And
as applied to both public and private institutions, tort law and contract
law are better developed, increasing the liability risk exposure of both
types of institutions.6" The remainder of this section focuses more
specifically on some aspects of these developments in order to illustrate
their impact on higher education law.
B. The Rise And Containment Of The State Action Doctrine
Before a court will apply constitutional guarantees of individual
rights against a postsecondary institution, the court must first determine
that the institution's action is "state (or governmental) action."I" Over
the past twenty-five years, the United States Supreme Court has first expanded,62 and then contracted, 63 the circumstances in which state action
64
may be found. The most recent cases, such as Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
discussed below, have further contained the doctrine and cast doubt upon
how much of the state action law developed by federal courts in the past
twenty-five years can still be considered valid.
Courts and commentators have dissected the state action concept in
many ways, but at heart state action holdings can be fit into one of
three categories: (1) the delegated power category (where the private
entity acts as an agent of government in performing a particular task
1"Both legislatures and state judiciaries have acted to limit sovereign immunity.
See, e.g., Lowe v. Texas Tech. Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1976) (applying statutory
waiver of sovereign immunity); Brungard v. Hartman, 483 Pa. 200, 394 A.2d 1265 (1978),
(applying a judicial abrogation of sovereign immunity to the higher education context).
- See, e.g., Jennings, Breach of Contract Suits Against Postsecondary Institutions:
Can They Succeed? 7 J. COLL. & U.L. 191 (1981); Nordin, The Contract to Educate:
Toward a More Workable Theory of the Student-University Relationship, 8 J. COLL. &
U.L. 141 (1982); Finkin, Regulation by Agreement: The Case of PrivateHigher Education,
65 IOWA L. REV. 1119 (1980); Hustoles, Faculty and Staff Dismissals: Developing Contract
and Tort Theories, 10 J. COLL. & U.L. 479 (1983-84). See generally, on risk exposure, R.
AIKEN, J. ADAMS,

AND J.

HALL, LEGAL LIABILITIES IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THEIR SCOPE AND

3 J. COLL. & U.L. 127 (1976).
" The state action doctrine has elicited a great deal of academic comment. See, e.g.,
Phillips, The Inevitable Incoherence of Modern State Action Doctrine, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J.
683 (1984); Friendly, The Public-Private Penumbra-Fourteen Years Later, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1289 (1982); Thigpen, The Application of Fourteenth Amendment Norms to Private
Colleges and Universities, 11 J. COLL. & U.L. 171 (1982); O'Neil, Private Universities and
Public Law, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 155 (1969-70).
", Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
". Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407
U.S. 551 (1972); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
I" Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); see also Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S.
991 (1982); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
MANAGEMENT,
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delegated to it by government); 65 (2) the public function category (where
the private entity performs a function generally considered the responsibility of government); 66 or (3) the government contacts category (where
the private entity obtains substantial resources, prestige, or encouragement from its contacts with government). 67 Two subcategories of the
government contacts category may also be discerned in Supreme Court
opinions: (1) the "joint venturer" (or "symbiotic relationship") subcategory, which requires the plaintiff to show that "the state has so far
insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with ... [the private
entity] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged
activity; "b8 and (2) the "nexus" subcategory, which requires that an
"inquiry [be made into] whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the state and the challenged action of the private entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the state itself.' "'9
Of these theories, government contacts and its variants has been
the most frequently applied to higher education. Arguments based on a
"delegated power" theory are seldom litigated. 71 Public function arguments have generally failed when they have been utilized.71 Thus the
basis for most plaintiffs' victories in state action litigation has been the
government contacts theory.72
A Supreme Court case decided in 1982, Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 7 is
the latest word on the application of these theories to education institutions. The Rendell-Baker litigation was instituted by teachers at a
private school who had been discharged as a result of their opposition
to school policies. They sued the school and its director, Kohn, alleging
that the discharges violated their federal constitutional rights to free
speech and due process. The defendant school specialized in dealing
See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
See, e.g., Burton, 365 U.S. 715; Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
Burton, 365 U.S. at 725.
Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351 (emphasis added).
7,) One exception is Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968), where the court held
that Alfred University was acting as a delegate of the State of New York with respect to
certain actions of its ceramics college.
7 Greenya v. George Washington Univ., 512 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1975), enunciates
the standard position: [Wle have considered whether higher education constitutes 'state
action' because it is a 'public function' as that term has been developed . . . and have
concluded that it is not . . . . [Elducation . . . has never been a state monopoly in the
United States." Greenya, 512 F.2d at 561, n.1O. But see State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535,
423 A.2d 615 (1980), where the court accorded serious consideration and extended
analysis to the public function theory.
11 See, e.g., Benner v. Oswald, 592 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1979); Braden v. University of
Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1977) (upholding trial court denial of motion to dismiss
for want of state action); Hammond v. University of Tampa, 344 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1965);
Buckton v. NCAA, 366 F. Supp. 1152 (D. Mass. 1973).
1' Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
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with students who have drug, alcohol, or behavioral problems or other
special needs. Nearly all students were referred by local public schools
or by the drug rehabilitation division of the state's department of health.
The school received funds for student tuition from the local public
school boards and was reimbursed by the state department of health for
services provided to students referred by the department. The school
also received funds from other state and federal agencies. Virtually all
the school's income, therefore, was derived from government funding.
The school was also subject to state regulation on various matters, such
as record keeping and student/teacher ratios, and to requirements concerning services provided under its contracts with the local school
boards and the state health department. Few of these requirements,
however, related to personnel policy.
Using an analysis based on the government contacts theory, the
Supreme Court held that neither the government funding nor the
government regulation was sufficient to make the school's discharge
decisions state action. As to funding, the Court determined:
The school . . . is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to build
roads, bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government. Acts of
such private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason
of their significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.
The school is also analogous to the public defender found not to be
a state actor in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1982). There we

concluded that, although the state paid the public defender, her relationship with her client was "identical to that existing between any other
lawyer and client" (454 U.S. at 318). Here the relationship between the
school and its teachers and counselors
is not changed because the state
74
pays the tuition of the students.

And as to regulations:
Here the decisions to discharge the petitioners were not compelled or
even influenced by any state regulation. Indeed, in contrast to the extensive regulation of the school generally, the various regulators showed
relatively little interest in the school's personnel matters. The most intrusive personnel regulation promulgated by the various government agencies
was the requirement that the Committee on Criminal Justice had the power
to approve persons hired as vocational counselors. Such a regulation is
not sufficient to make
a decision to discharge, made by private manage75
ment, state action.

The Court also considered and rejected two other arguments of the
teachers: that the school was engaged in state action because it performs
- Id. at 840-841.
Id. at 841-842.
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a "public function" and that the school had a "symbiotic relationship"
with-that is, was engaged in a "joint venture" with-government. As
to the former argument, the Court reasoned:
[Tihe relevant question is not simply whether a private group is
serving a "public function." We have held that the question is whether
the function performed has been "traditionally the exclusive prerogative
of the state".... There can be no doubt that the education of maladjusted
high school students is a public function, but that is only the beginning
of the inquiry. [Massachusetts law] demonstrates that the state intends to
provide service for such students at public expense. That legislative policy
choice in no way makes these services the exclusive province of the state.
Indeed, the Court of Appeals [in Rendell-Baker] noted that until recently
the state had not undertaken to provide education for students who could
not be served by traditional public schools. That a private entity performs
a function which serves the public does not make its acts state action.7
As to the latter argument, the Court concluded simply that "the school's
fiscal relationship with the state is not different from that of many
contractors performing services for the government.
No symbiotic rela77
tionship such as existed in Burton exists here."
Rendell-Baker appears to confirm the validity of many of the more

recent cases where the courts have refused to find state action respecting
activities of postsecondary institutions, and to cast doubt on some other
cases where state action has been found. The case may thus serve in
many circumstances to insulate postsecondary institutions from state
action findings and the resultant application of federal constitutional
constraints to their activities. Rendell-Baker, however, does not create
an impenetrable protective barrier for postsecondary institutions. In
particular, there may be situations in which government is directly
involved in the challenged activity-in contrast to the absence of
government involvement in the personnel actions challenged in Rendell-Baker. Such involvement may supply the "nexus" missing in the
Supreme Court case. 7 Moreover, there may be situations, unlike Rendell-Baker, in which government officials by virtue of their offices are
members of, or nominate others for, an institution's board of trustees.
Such involvement, perhaps in combination with other "contacts," may
create the "symbiotic relationship" that did not exist in the Supreme
Court case.7 9

1,,Id.

at 842.
Id. at 843.
'" See Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1982), a case which, like
"

Rendell-Baker, involved the operation of a private school specializing in the treatment of
adolescents with behavioral problems. The court found state action because a nexus could
be established between state regulations and laws and the actions challenged by the
students who were the plaintiffs.
7" See Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984), where the
court found both the University of Pittsburgh and Temple University to be engaged in
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Alternative Sources Of Rights Assertable Against Private Institutions

The tightening of the state action doctrine has not meant that
students, faculty members, and others in the private school community
have no legal rights to assert against their institutions. There are other
sources for individual rights, developed during the past twenty-five
years, providing protections that sometimes approximate those found in
the Constitution.
The federal government and, to a lesser extent, state governments
have increasingly created statutory rights enforceable against private
institutions, particularly in the discrimination area. The federal Title
VII prohibition on employment discrimination, 0 applicable generally to
public and private employment relationships, is a prominent example.
The Title VI race discrimination law" and the Title IX sex discrimination law,2 applicable to federal aid recipients, are other major examples.
Such sources provide a large body of law which parallels and in some
ways is more protective than the equal protection principles derived
from the Constitution's fourteenth amendment.
Beyond such statutory rights, several common lAw approaches to
protecting individual rights in private postsecondary institutions have
been developed during the past quarter century. Most prominent by far
is the contract theory, under which students and faculty members are
said to have a contractual relationship with their institutions.' Express
or implied contract terms establish legal rights that can be enforced in
court if the contract is breached. Although the theory is a useful one,
most courts have agreed that the contract law of the commercial world
cannot be imported wholesale into the academic environment 4 and that

state action because state statutes had in many respects incorporated the two universities
into the "Commonwealth System of Higher Education" and had thus created symbiotic
relationships with the two schools; see also McVarish v. Mid-Nebraska Community Mental
Health Center, 696 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-20OO0e-17 (1982).
42 U.S.C. § 2OOd-2000d-6 (1982).
20 U.S.C. § 1681-1686 (1982).
See supra note 60. Other theories for student common law rights have occasionally
been suggested by commentators, but they are seldom reflected in court opinions. See,
e.g., Goldman, The University and the Liberty of Its Students-A Fiduciary Theory, 54
Ky. L.J. 643 (1966); Note, Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expulsion and Governance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 95 (1973) (common law of private associations).
For a comparison of the various theories and cites to illustrative cases, see Tedeschi v.
Wagner College, 49 N.Y.2d 652, 404 N.E.2d 1302, 1304-1306 (1980).
See, e.g., Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1975). The
court in Slaughter stated:
The trial court's rigid application of commercial contract doctrine advanced
by plaintiff was in error, and the submission on that theory alone was error.
It is apparent that some elements of the law of contracts are used and
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the theory must be applied with sensitivity to academic customs and
usages. Moreover, the theory's impact has been limited because the
"terms" of the "contract" may be difficult to identify, particularly in
the case of students. And once identified, the terms may sometimes be
too vague or ambiguous to enforce, or may be so barren of content or
so one-sided in favor of the institution as to be an insignificant source
of individual rights.
Despite its shortcomings, the contract theory has gained substantial
importance since the late 1960s as it has become clearer that most
private institutions, most of the time, can escape the tentacles of the
state action doctrine. With the lowering of the age of majority, postsecondary students attained the capacity to contract under state law-a
capacity that many previously did not have. "' In what had become the
age of the consumer, students were encouraged to import consumer
rights into postsecondary education. 86 And in an age of collective
negotiation and increased sensitivity to employees' rights, faculties
often sought to rely on a contract model for ordering employment
relationships on campus.87
State constitutions have also assumed critical importance as a
source of individual rights assertable against private institutions. Several recent cases-two involving private universities-have relied on
state constitutions to create individual rights of speech, petition, and
assembly on private property. The key case is Prune Yard Shopping
Center v. Robins."8
A group of high school students distributing political material and
soliciting petition signatures had been excluded from a private shopping
center. The students sought an injunction in state court to prevent
further exclusions. The California Supreme Court sided with the students, holding that they had a state constitutional right to access to the
shopping center to engage in expressive activity. In the United States
Supreme Court, the shopping center argued that the California court's
should be used in the analysis of the relationship between plaintiff and the
university to provide some framework into which to put the problem of expulsion for disciplinary reasons. This does not mean that "contract law" must be
rigidly applied in all its aspects, nor is it so applied even when the contract
analogy is extensively adopted ....

The student-university relationship is

unique, and it should not be and cannot be stuffed into one doctrinal category.
Id. at 626.
". See D. HANSON, THE LOWERED AGE OF MAJORITY:

ITS IMPACT ON HIGHER EDUCATION

(1975).
"

See R. LAUDICINA & J. TRAMUTOLA,

A LEGAL OVERVIEW OF THE NEW STUDENT As

EDUCATIONAL CONSUMER, CITIZEN, AND BARGAINER (1976); Comment, Consumer Protection
and Higher Education-Student Suits Against Schools, 37 OHIo ST. L.J. 608 (1976).
"' See Finkin, supra note 60.
Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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ruling was inconsistent with an earlier Supreme Court precedent, Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner,89 which held that the first amendment of the federal
Constitution does not guarantee individuals a right to free expression
on the premises of a private shopping center. The Court rejected the
argument, emphasizing that the state had a "sovereign right to adopt
in its own constitution individual liberties more expansive than those
conferred by the federal Constitution." 90 The Court then determined
that when the private entity was free to impose reasonable "time, place,
and manner" restrictions on the expressive activity so as to "minimize
any interference with its . . . functions," ' 1 it did not suffer an unconstitutional deprivation of property under the federal Constitution.
Prune Yard gained significance in educational settings with the
New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Schmid.92 The defendant, who was not a student, had been charged with criminal trespass
for distributing political material on the Princeton University campus
in violation of Princeton regulations. The defendant claimed that the
regulations violated his rights to freedom of expression under both the
federal Constitution and the New Jersey state constitution. Although, in
the absence of a state action finding, the federal first amendment could
not apply to the defendant's claim, the court did not find itself similarly
constrained in applying the state constitution. Addressing the defendant's state constitutional claim, the court determined that the state
constitutional provisions protecting freedom of expression (even though
similar to the first amendment) could be construed more expansively
than the first amendment so as to reach Princeton's actions. The court
reaffirmed that state constitutions are independent sources of individual
rights; that state constitutional protections may surpass the protections
of the federal Constitution; and that this greater expansiveness can exist
even if the state provision is identical to the federal provision because
state constitutional rights are not simply mirror images of federal rights.
IV.

THE DEVELOPING DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN
SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

To understand higher education law's development over the past
twenty-five years, one must draw a distinction not only between public
and private institutions but also among different types of private institutions. The most fundamental distinction is that between private insti-

- Tanner, 407 U.S. 551.
Robins, 447 U.S. at 81.
Id. at 83.
State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (the "Princeton University
Case").
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tutions of a secular character and those institutions that are religious or
sectarian. Further distinctions are also drawn among various types of
sectarian institutions. These distinctions have grown in importance over
the last twenty-five years, both with respect to the evolving constitutional law on church-state relations and with respect to various federal
and state statutory enactments that have a direct or indirect regulatory
impact on private higher education.
A.

Constitutional Distinctions Between Secular and Religious Institutions

A glance backward twenty-five years would reveal a rather unfamiliar constitutional church-state landscape. Still in the future were
such landmark cases as Engel v. Vitale, 93 prohibiting state-sponsored
nondenominational prayer in public elementary and secondary schools,
and Abington School District v. Schempp,9 4 proscribing Bible reading

at the opening of each school day. Also in the future lay the United States
Supreme Court's formulation in Lemon v. Kurtzman 95 of a three-pronged

test for determining when government support for private schools
violates the first amendment's establishment clause. In order for such
aid to be constitutional, according to the Lemon standards announced
in 1971, it "must have a secular legislative purpose," "its principal or
primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion,"
and it "must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.' "'"n In
the even more remote future there loomed cases that would explore the
limits of the free exercise rights that private institutions could claim
under the first amendment. 7
For private postsecondary institutions with a religious orientation,
the most important development of the last quarter century may have
been a trilogy of establishment clause cases that defines the types of
assistance governments may permissibly give to religious institutions.
The earliest of these cases, Tilton v. Richardson98 (a companion case to
Lemon), upheld, by a 5-to-4 vote, grants made to particular religious
colleges under the Higher Education Facilities Act. In Hunt v. McNair,9
the Court, by a 6-to-3 vote, sustained a state program that assisted
colleges, including religious colleges, by issuing revenue bonds for
their construction projects. And in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,' 00
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 302 (1963).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
I. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commissioner, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
For example, Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), discussed
infra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., Board of Public Works of Md., 426 U.S.
736 (1976).
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the Court, by a 5-to-4 vote, upheld Maryland's program of general
support grants to private, including religious, colleges.
Although all three cases upheld the extension of aid to religious
institutions, the Court's opinions did recognize that the establishment
clause forbids some forms of aid to such religious institutions. In
particular, the Court in Hunt, relying on the second of Lemon's three
prongs (primary effect), held:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing
religion when it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive
that a substantial portion of its functions are subsumed in the religious
mission or when it funds a specifically religious activity in an otherwise
substantially secular setting.'
This formulation, indicating that "pervasively sectarian" postsecondary
institutions are ineligible for direct institutional aid, requires that a
distinction be drawn not only between secular and religious institutions
but also between religious institutions that are "pervasively" religious
or sectarian and those that are not. 10
After the Tilton-Hunt-Roemer trilogy stimulated an uneasy truce in
the battle over the meaning of the establishment clause, skirmishes
began over the meaning of the free exercise clause in the higher
education context. The most prominent case thus far has been Bob Jones
University v. United States.10 3 The case concerned the Internal Revenue
Service's revocation, in 1971, of the tax-exempt status that Bob Jones
University had enjoyed under the charitable contribution provisions of
the federal tax code.104 The IRS cited the university's racially discriminatory policies as the basis for the revocation. 10 5 The university defended itself from this charge by arguing, among other things, that its

Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743. See also, Greenawalt, Constitutional Limits on Aid to
Secretarian Universities, 4 J. COLL. & U.L. 177 (1977); O'Hara, State Aid to Sectarian
Higher Education, 14 J. OF L. & EDUC. 181 (1985).
'll The United States Supreme Court has recently issued a writ of certiorari in another
higher education case raising establishment clause issues; see Witters v. State Comm'n
for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 689 P.2d 53 (1984), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3697
(1985). Unlike the earlier cases, this case considers the validity of government assistance
to students attending religious institutions (as opposed to institutions themselves). The
student in Witters is a blind ministry student denied state assistance available to other
blind students. The Washington Supreme Court upheld the denial because, in its view,
such assistance would have the effect of advancing religion, thus violating the second
prong of the Lemon test.
Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. 574.
See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, formalizing an IRS policy of revoking the
tax-exempt status of any school "discriminat[ing] on the basis of race in administration
of its educational policies, admissions policies, scholarship and loan programs and
athletic and other school-administered programs." 1971-2 C.B. at 230.
1"1Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 581.
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racial policies were mandated by sincerely held religious beliefs and
thus protected by the free exercise clause. 1- The Supreme Court rejected
the university's free exercise claim:
[Tihe free exercise clause provides substantial protection for lawful
conduct grounded in religious belief ....
However, "not all burdens on
religion are unconstitutional ....
The state may justify a limitation on

religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an overriding
governmental interest" (United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982)).
On occasion this Court has found certain governmental interests so
compelling as to allow even regulations prohibiting religiously-based
conduct. In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), for example,
the Court held that neutrally cast child labor laws prohibiting sale of
printed materials on public streets could be applied to prohibit children
from dispensing religious literature ....
Denial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the
operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools
from observing their religious tenets.
The governmental interest at stake here is compelling. As discussed
the government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
racial discrimination in education-discrimination that prevailed, with
official approval, for the first 165 years of this nation's history. That
governmental interest substantially outweighs whatever burden denial of
tax benefits places on petitioners' exercise of their religious beliefs. The
interests asserted by petitioners cannot be accommodated with that compelling governmental interest. . . and no "less restrictive means"
are available to achieve the governmental interest.' 7
The Court in Bob Jones thereby determined that the free exercise
clause does not permit a religious institution that discriminates by race
to take advantage of the tax treatment accorded other private nonprofit
institutions. In so doing, the Court rejected the proffered distinction
between secular and religious private institutions in the particular
context of eligibility for government benefits where racial discrimination
is at issue. The wording of the Court's opinion, however, may still
permit distinctions to be drawn in other contexts. First, religious
institutions that discriminate on a basis other than race may still remain
eligible for governmental benefits if the government interest in eradicating other forms of discrimination is not as "compelling" as the interest
in eradicating race discrimination. Second, other types of governmental
actions, especially regulatory actions, may impose greater burdens on
religious institutions, which in turn may prevent them from "observing
their religious tenets." Either or both of these grounds may support
distinctions between secular and religious institutions as well as among
different types of religious institutions, depending on the nature of the
clash between sincerely held religious beliefs and government interests.
id. at 580-581.
Id. at 603-604.
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A pre-Bob Jones case, EEOC v. MississippiCollege,' 8 illustrates the
free exercise clause's application to religious institutions in a context
different from that in Bob Jones. The charging party was a non-Baptist

female part-time psychology instructor at the college. When the college
rejected her application for a full-time position, she filed a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission charging sex discrimina09
tion violating the federal Title VII employment discrimination statute. 1
The college, operated by the Mississippi Baptist Convention, had a policy
of preferring active Baptists in filling faculty slots. The college refused
to respond to an EEOC subpoena and asserted, in part, that any application of Title VII would impermissibly burden the college's free exercise
of religion. The court, recognizing that Title VII has a built-in exception
(sec. 702) permitting religious institutions to discriminate on the basis
of religion,110 held that Title Vil's impact on Mississippi College's religious
beliefs woudl be minimal:
The impact of Title VII upon the exercise of the religious belief is

limited in scope and degree. Section 702 excludes from the scope of Title
VII those employment practices of the college that discriminate on the
basis of religion. We acknowledge that, except for those practices that fall
outside of Title VII, the impact of Title VII on the college could be
profound. To the extent that the college's practices foster sexual or racial

discrimination, the EEOC, if unable to persuade the college to alter them
voluntarily, could seek a court order compelling their modification, imposing injunctive restraints upon the college's freedom to make employment decisions, and awarding monetary relief to those persons aggrieved
by the prohibited acts. However, the relevant inquiry is not the impact of
the statute upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the
institution's exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs. The fact that
those of the college's employment practices subject to Title VII do not
embody religious beliefs or practices protects the college from any real
threat of undermining its religious purpose of fulfilling the evangelical
role of the Mississippi Baptist Convention, and allows us to conclude that
the impact of Title VII on the free exercise of religious beliefs is minimal.
Second, the government has a compelling interest in eradicating
discrimination in all forms .... Congress manifested that interest in the

enactment of Title VII and the other sections of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. The proscription upon racial discrimination in particular is mandated not only by congressional enactments but also by the Thirteenth
Amendment. We conclude that the government's compelling interest in
eradicating discrimination is sufficient to justify the minimal burden
imposed upon the college's free exercise of religious beliefs that results
from the application of Title VII. II

E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1. Section 702 is quoted in text accompanying note 118, infa.
Mississippi College, 626 F.2d

at 488-489.
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Unlike the tax statute at issue in Bob Jones, the Title VII statute at
issue in Mississippi College is a regulatory statute, carrying with it a set
of obligations and affirmative remedies for violation. Were it not for the
exception in Section 702, this statute could impose greater burdens on
the religious institution than the loss of governmental tax benefits did
in Bob Jones. In two footnotes, the Mississippi College court referred to
the college's practice of hiring only males to teach courses on the Bible,
a practice the college maintained was mandated by sincere religious
belief.112 Had this practice been at issue, it would not have fallen within
the Section 702 exception because it would have been discrimination
based on the applicant's sex rather than on her religion. Application of
Title VII would thus have created a direct burden on the college's
religious beliefs. Moreover, the government's interest would have been
the eradication of sex discrimination rather than race discrimination. In
these circumstances, reliance on the free exercise clause as a defense to
EEOC jurisdiction may have led to a result different from that reached
in either Mississippi College or Bob Jones.
Just as establishment clause case law requires a distinction between
religious institutions that are "pervasively sectarian" and those that are
not, the developing free exercise clause jurisprudence also requires that
distinctions be drawn among types of religious institutions. For instance, in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary," 3 a
religious seminary raised a Title VII issue similar to that in Mississippi
College. The seminary was a nonprofit corporation owned, operated,
supported, and controlled by the Southern Baptist Convention. It offered
degrees only in theology, religious education, and church music, and
its purposes and character were described by the court as "wholly
sectarian." The EEOC had asked the seminary to complete form EEO-6,
a routine information report. When the seminary refused, the EEOC
sued to compel compliance under Title VII's record-keeping and report4
ing provision."
The court determined that the general principles set out in Mississippi College applied to this case but that the differing factual setting
required a result partly different from that in Mississippi College. In
particular, the court held that "Title VII does not apply to the employment relationship between this seminary and its faculty.""' Reasoning
that the Southwestern Baptist Seminary, unlike Mississippi College,
was "entitled to the status of 'church'" and that its faculty "fit the
definition of 'ministers,"' the court determined that Congress did not
intend to include this ecclesiastical relationship within Title VII, since
the regulation of such relationships would violate the free exercise

Id. at 487-488, nn. 12-13.
- EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist TheologicalSeminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981].
- 42 U.S.C. § 2oo0e-8(c); see Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 279-281.
1. Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284.
-

1985]

OVERVIEW

clause." 6 Using the same reasoning, the court also excluded from Title
VII administrative positions that are "traditionally ecclesiastical or
ministerial," citing as likely examples the "president and executive
vice-president of the seminary, the chaplain, the dean of men and
women, the academic deans, and those other personnel who equate to
or supervise faculty."" 7 But the court refused to exclude other administrative and support staff from Title VII, even if the employees filling
those positions are ordained ministers. This reasoning, according special protection to institutions whose employment positions are based on
ecclesiatical relationships, serves to create a distinction under the free
exercise clause between religious seminaries and other types of religious
institutions.
B.

Statutory Distinctions Between Secular and Religious Institutions

The constitutional landscape is not the only church-state landscape
altered during the last twenty-five years. The statutory enactments
signed into law in this period, and their applications to religious
institutions, would present the visitor from 1960 with a terrain that
could then have been only vaguely charted. These laws were usually
written to apply to private institutions generally, often in combination
with public institutions. The special concerns attending the application
of these statutes to religious institutions were sometimes explicitly
recognized and resolved in the statutory language. At other times, where
the applications were unclear, courts were called upon to plumb the
depths of legislative histories to discern the intent of the drafters and
to compare the statutory provisions with principles already established
by first amendment case law.
Title VII contains a leading example of the explicit statutory provision dealing with religious educational institutions. Section 702 of Title
VII, mentioned briefly above, provides:
This title shall not apply to . . . a religious corporation, association,
educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of
individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or
society of its activities.- 8

"I The court based this portion of its opinion on McClure v. Salvation Army, 460
F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). The plaintiff was an ordained Salvation Army minister who
claimed that the Salvation Army had discriminated against her in violation of Title VII.
The court held that Title VII did not apply to the employment relationship between a
church and its minister, basing its conclusion on a line of Supreme Court cases holding
that judicial interference in intra-ecclesiastical disputes would ordinarily violate the free
exercise clause.
17
Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 284-285.
- 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1.
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The precise application of this provision to religious postsecondary
institutions was another issue (in addition to the free exercise clause
issue) raised in EEOC v. Mississippi College. 119 The disappointed job
applicant had claimed that the college's decision not to hire her was an
act of sex discrimination. The college argued that the EEOC had no
authority to investigate the claim because it fell within the bounds of
the Section 702 exemption. According to the court:
[I]f a religious institution of the kind described in Section 702 presents
convincing evidence that the challenged employment practice resulted
from discrimination on the basis of religion, Section 702 deprives the
EEOC of jurisdiction to investigate further to determine whether the
religious discrimination was a pretext for some other form of discrimination. This interpretation of Section 702 is required to avoid the conflicts
that would result between the rights guaranteed by the religion clauses of
the First Amendment and the EEOC's exercise of jurisdiction over religious
educational institutions .... If the district court determines on remand

that the college applied its policy of preferring Baptists over non-Baptists
in granting the faculty position to [the party hired for the position] rather
than [the disappointed applicant], then Section 702 exempts that decision
from the application of Title VII and would preclude any investigation by
the EEOC to determine whether the college used the preference policy as
a guise to hide some other form of discrimination. On the other hand,
should the evidence disclose only that the college's preference policy
could have been applied, but in fact it was not considered by the college
in determining which applicant to hire, Section 702 does not bar the
EEOC's investigation of [the disappointed applicant's] individual sex
discrimination claim.in
This treatment of religious institutions differs from that accorded
secular institutions in Title VII investigations. Once the religious college
has shown that the applicant's religion was a basis for its decision, the
EEOC may not attempt to rebut this proof with evidence that religion was
a pretext for some other form of discrimination. When challenging a secular
institution's hiring policy, on the other hand, the EEOC would be free
to inquire further to determine whether the institution's articulated policies
2
were actually a pretext for race or sex discrimination.1 1
Other statutes also recognize distinctions between religious and
secular institutions. Title IX, for example, contains an exemption for
religious institutions from any provision of the Act that would be
inconsistent with their "religious tenets." 122 Another example is the

Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477.
,, Id. at 485-86.
Ill
See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
which painstakingly clarifies the evidentiary standards generally applicable to Title VII
disparate treatment cases.
.
12 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (a)(3) provides
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Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). 123 At one time the employees
of most private postsecondary institutions, as well as of most private
elementary and secondary schools, were exempt from FUTA. In 1970
and 1976, however, Congress approved a series of amendments that
greatly narrowed this exemption. Private secular schools were clearly
subjected to the Act as a result of these amendments; religious institutions could still be exempted, but only if they fell within this definition:
This section shall not apply to service performed(1) in the employ of (A) a church or convention or association of
churches, or (B) an organization which is operated primarily for religious
purposes and which is operated, supervised, controlled, or principally
1 4
supported by a church or convention or association of churches.
2

In St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 12 s the United
States Supreme Court construed this provision in a manner that would
enable some religious postsecondary institutions-but probably only a
small portion of the total-to remain exempt from FUTA.
The National Labor Relations Act' 26 is an example of a statute that
has no explicit provision on coverage of religious institutions but has
legislative history that courts have utilized to narrow its application to
religious schools. In the leading case, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of
Chicago, 27 the United States Supreme Court held that Congress did not
intend the Act to apply to "church-operated" schools. The Catholic
Bishop case dealt only with elementary and secondary schools, however,
and it is unclear whether the opinion's reasoning could be extended to
"church-operated" postsecondary institutions. The NLRB has thus far
declined to extend Catholic Bishop in this manner, 2 but the judiciary
has not yet provided an answer to the issue.
Statutory exceptions like these have been created in recognition of
religious institutions' special mission that differs from those of secular
institutions and in recognition of the special status of religious institutions under the first amendment. Sometimes these considerations have
yielded broad exemption for religious institutions; sometimes the exemption has been quite narrow or nonexistent. In either circumstance,
1

fIhis

section [Title IXJ shall not apply to an educational institution which is
controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection would
not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization.

- 26
26
- St.
- 29

124

U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1982).
U.S.C. § 3309(b)(1).
Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981).
U.S.C. § 141-187 (1982).

- NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
- See, e.g., Lewis University, 265 NLRB 1239 (1982); Barber-Scotia College, 245
NLRB 906 (1979); and College of Notre Dome (Calif), 245 NLRB 386 (1979).
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over the past twenty-five years, the debate about religious institutions'
status under federal and state legislation has increased in visibility and
scope as well as in complexity.
V.

THE INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO CHANGING
TIMES: PREVENTIVE LEGAL PLANNING

As the introductory section to this article indicates, the past quarter
century has been marked by rapid expansion in the types and numbers
of lawsuits against postsecondary institutions, the occasions in which
institutions themselves resort to the courts to protect their interests, and
the availability of forums other than courts for the resolution of legal
disputes.' 2 9 Inextricably linked with these developments has been the
rapid expansion of the legal obligations to which postsecondary institutions are subject under the federal and state constitutions, federal and
state statutes, government agency regulations, and judicially developed
common law principles. The result is a dramatic increase in the legal
risk exposure-the potential legal liabilities-of postsecondary institutions.
Postsecondary institutions have not stood passively aside watching
these events transpire. As might be expected, the past twenty-five years
have witnessed great changes in the way institutions and their attorneys
have organized themselves to deal with legal risks-an era beginning
with the establishment in 1960 of the National Association of College
and University Attorneys. Over the years since then, colleges and
universities-especially larger ones-have increasingly employed house
counsel to undertake their legal work.130 Such arrangements have the

advantage of providing daily coordinated services of resident counsel
acclimated to the particular needs and problems of the institution.
Though staff counsel can become specialists in higher education law,
however, they normally will not have the time or exposure to become
expert in all the specialty areas (such as labor law, tax law, patent law,
or litigation) with which institutions must deal. Thus, institutions with
house counsel also usually retain private law firms for such special
problems.
Other institutions, large and small, still arrange for all their legal

'"
For analysis'of the nature and costs of litigation in the United States, see Wald,
Introduction, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1983); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes:
What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious
and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4 (1983); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer, and
Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 72 (1983).
11" See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ATTORNEYS,

COMMITTEE ON

MEMBER SERVICES, DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES TO HIGHER EDUCATION INSTrrUTIONS: A SURVEY

(1984), reprinted with modifications in 15 Coa. L. DIG. 7 (1984), printed in WEST'S
EDUCATION LAW REPORTER, NACUA SPECIAL PAMPHLET (Sept. 20, 1984).
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services to be provided by one or more private law firms.' 3 ' This
arrangement has the advantage of increasing the number of attorneys
with particular expertise available for the variety of problems that
confront institutions. A potential disadvantage that has developed over
time is that no one attorney will be conversant with the full range of
the institution's needs and problems nor be on call daily for early
participation in administrative decision making. Institutions depending
on private firms today thus need to ensure that at least one lawyer is
generally familiar with and involved in the institution's affairs and
regularly available for consultation even on routine matters.
With each of these organizational arrangements, it has become
critically important for institutions to give serious consideration to the
particular functions that counsel will perform and to the relationships
that will be fostered between counsel and institutional administrators.
Broadly stated, counsel's role is to identify, define, and provide options
for resolving legal problems. But there are two basic, and different,
ways to fulfill this role: through treatment law or through preventive
law. To analogize to another profession, the former involves curing
legal diseases; the latter involves maintaining legal health.
Treatment law, as the more traditional of the two approaches, was
predominant in 1960. It focuses on actual challenges to institutional
practices and on affirmative legal steps by the institution to protect its
interests when they are threatened. When suit is filed against the
institution, or litigation is threatened; when a government agency cites
the institution for noncompliance with its regulations; when the institution needs formal permission of a government agency to undertake a
proposed course of action; when the institution wishes to sue some
other party-then treatment law operates. The goal is to resolve the
specific legal problem at hand. Treatment law today is indispensable to
the functioning of a postsecondary institution, and virtually all institutions have such legal service.
Preventive law, in contrast, focuses on initiatives that the institution
can take before actual legal disputes arise. 132 Preventive law involves
administrator and counsel in a continual process of establishing the
degree of legal risk exposure the institution is willing to assume in
particular situations and avoiding or resolving the legal risks it is
unwilling to assume.' 33 The success of such legal planning depends on
a careful sorting out and interrelating of legal and policy issues.
131 Id.
131

See generally L.
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(1978). See also Brown and Schaffer, Toward a Jurisprud-

ence for the Law Office, 17 AM. J. JURIs. 125, 125-136, 140-144 (1972), for a discussion of

some of the elements of preventive law.
11:.For a helpful checklist to guide this process, see A
ENT COUEGES AND UNIVERSmTEs (K.M. Weeks, ed., 1981).
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Teamwork between administrator and lawyer is therefore a critical
ingredient.
Since the distinctions between the administrator's and the lawyer's
functions are not always self-evident, roles should be developed by a
process of mutual interchange between the two sets of professionals.
While considerable flexibility is possible, institutions should be careful
to maintain a distinction between the two roles. The purpose of preventive law is not to make the administrator into a lawyer or the lawyer
into an administrator. It is the lawyer's job to sensitize administrators
to legal issues and the importance of recognizing them early; to resolve
doubts about the interpretation of statutes, regulations, and court decisions; to stay informed of legal developments and gauge their impact
on institutional operations; and to suggest legal options for avoiding or
resolving problems and analyze their relative legal risks. But it is for
the administrator (along with boards of trustees) to stay informed of
developments in the theory and practice of administration; to devise
policy options within the constraints imposed by law and determine
their relative effectiveness in achieving institutional goals; and ultimately, at the appropriate level of the institutional hierarchy, to make
the policy decisions that give life to the institution.
Preventive law was not a general practice of postsecondary institutions at the beginning of this past quarter century. But the concept
became increasingly valuable as law's presence on the campus increased, and acceptance of preventive law within postsecondary education has grown substantially, especially since the mid-1970s. Today
it may fairly be said that preventive law is as indispensable as treatment
law and provides the more constructive posture from which to conduct
institutional legal affairs.
CONCLUSION

Higher education in 1985 operates in a vastly different legal environment than that existing in 1960. This article has identified and
analyzed some of the broadest themes that mark these twenty-five years.
It is equally important, however, to evaluate the impact that these
developments have had on the campus.
Law's role on the campuses has been subject to much recent
criticism. It is said that the law reaches too far and speaks too loudly.
Especially because of the courts' and the federal government's involvement, it is said that legal proceedings and compliance with legal
requirements are too costly in money, talents, and energies; that they
divert higher education from its primary mission of teaching and
scholarship; and that they erode the integrity of campus decision
making by bending it to real or perceived legal technicalities that are
not always in the campus community's best interests.'3 4 Such criticisms
134

See, e.g., Gouldner, The Social Impact of Campus Litigation, 51 J.

328 (1980).
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highlight pressing issues for higher education's future, but they do not
reveal all sides of these issues. We cannot evaluate the role of law on
campus by looking only at dollars expended, hours of time logged,
pages of compliance reports completed, or numbers of legal proceedings
participated in. We must also consider a number of less quantifiable
questions: Are legal claims made against institutions, faculty, or staff
usually frivolous or unimportant, or are they often justified? Are institutions providing adequate mechanisms for dealing with claims and
complaints internally, thus helping themselves avoid any negative effects of outside legal proceedings? Are courts and college counsel doing
an adequate job of sorting out frivolous from justifiable claims, and of
developing means for summary disposition of frivolous claims, where
appropriate, and settlement of justifiable ones? Are courts being sensitive to the mission of higher education when they apply legal rules to
campuses or devise remedies in suits lost by institutions?". 5 Do government regulations for the campus implement worthy policy goals, and
are they adequately sensitive to higher education's mission?1 3 6 In situations where law's message has appeared to conflict with the best
interests of the campus community, what have been education's responses: To kill the messenger, or to develop more positive remedies?
To hide behind rhetoric, or to forthrightly document and defend its
interests?
We do not yet know all we should about these questions. But they
are surely questions worthy of study as we chart the impact of the past
twenty-five years, and they provide a critical counterpoint to questions
about dollars, time, and pages. We must have insight into both sets of
questions before we can fully understand law's influence on the campus
and separate its beneficial from its detrimental effects in the various
contexts in which law has made its presence known.
'-

See, e.g., Hobbs, The Courts,

in HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY, at

(P.G. Altbach and R.O. Berdahl ed. 1981).
1:16See, e.g., H. EDWARDS, HIGHER EDUCATION
GOVERNMENT REGULATION.
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